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Abstract This article examines the relation between counting, counts and account-
ability. It does so by comparing the responses of the British government to deaths 
associated with Covid-19 in 2020 to its responses to deaths associated with the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Similarities and dissimilarities between the cases regarding what 
counted as data, what data were taken to count, what data counted for, and how 
data were counted provide the basis for considering how the bounds of democratic 
accountability are constituted. Based on these two cases, the article sets out the met-
aphors of leaks and cascades as ways of characterising the data practices whereby 
counts, counting and accountability get configured. By situating deaths associ-
ated with Covid-19 against previous experience with deaths from war, the article 
also proposes how claims to truth and ignorance might figure in any future official 
inquiry into the handling of the pandemic.
Keywords Ignorance · Accountability · Excess deaths · Covid-19 · Iraq · Data
1 Introduction
Data fracture. Historical, political and sociological studies of science have explored 
the contrasting but often co-existing characterisations of data: given and made 
(Leonelli, 2016) as well as speaking for themselves and needing to be spoken for 
(Latour, 1987). Their evidential standing is frequently not just about the status of 
data per se, but bound up with the identity of those that hold and notionally generate 
them (Shapin, 1994). The adage ‘Knowledge is power’ speaks to enduring tenets in 
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popular culture and academic scholarship alike. In line with the doubleness that so 
often characterises data and knowledge, however, claims to ignorance and uncer-
tainty have likewise been identified as bases for establishing epistemic warrant and 
exercising political control (Gross & McGoey, 2015; Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008).
As part of attempts to scale the Covid-19 pandemic, notable efforts have been 
undertaken to determine the number of deaths associated with the virus. While 
such aggregates provide a comparatively trackable measure of harm, their accuracy 
and reliability have also been recurring topics of debate.1 The multi-faceted status 
of deaths tallies—actual and protean, given and made—is the focus of this article. 
Its central aim is to establish how the mobilisation and communication of data on 
deaths constitute and delimit democratic accountability.
The chief method for doing so is comparison. As explored by Musu (2020), as 
with past diseases and other crises, the relationship between human populations and 
Covid-19 has often been likened to an armed conflict. War has served as an organ-
ising analogy for imagining who and what is involved, what is at stake as well as 
what needs to be done. Rather than approaching Covid-19 through the refractions of 
this analogy, I offer an alternative basis for analysis that still draws on war, namely: 
juxtaposing how knowledge and ignorance are alternatively marshalled in pandem-
ics and armed conflicts. Specifically I compare the responses of British government 
officials2 to deaths associated with Covid-19 during the first wave of the pandemic 
in 2020 to the responses of officials to deaths from the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
To propose comparison as the method for analysis only signals what direction 
will be taken in the most preliminary sense. Comparison is often identified as ‘trou-
bled’ methodology (Brettell, 2009) because it entails reducing the complexity of 
cases in favour of being able to pull out certain similarities and differences (Deville 
et al., 2016). As a result, comparative studies are invariably accompanied by ques-
tions: What should be compared to what? On which basis? For what purpose?
This article compares Covid-19 and the Iraq war in relation to how officials 
accounted for deaths. In particular, it examines the relationship between tallied 
deaths counts, the counting of deaths and attempts to stymie political accountabil-
ity for deaths. It elaborates two metaphors for characterising the relation between 
counts, counting and accountability: cascades and leaks. By cascades, I refer to 
data practices in which data are successively refined, but the very dynamism of that 
refinement is positioned as a basis for treating data as provisional. This metaphor 
characterises the manner in which accountability for tallied deaths has been fore-
stalled despite the considerable efforts made to count deaths associated with Covid-
19. By leaks I refer to data practices in which partialness in the assemblage of data 
is positioned as the basis for arguing against the prospects for assembling data. This 
1 Added to this, the appropriateness of mortality figures to serve as a metric for loss or progress is 
fraught. Whether or not Joseph Stalin uttered the unsettling quote attributed to him—“A single death is a 
tragedy, a million deaths are a statistic”—the quantification of human suffering brings with it questions 
about the affective limits of abstracted representations (Wernimont, 2018).
2 The United Kingdom includes four individual nations: England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
which are governed through a complex arrangement of UK-wide and devolved powers. For the purpose 
of this article, it is important to note that each nation has its own public health agency.
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metaphor characterises the manner in which British officials both refuted specific 
death counts as well as the ability to count deaths in the case of the Iraq war.
In making clear the indeterminate relation between data, counting, counts and 
accountability, this argument illustrates how claims to knowledge and ignorance can 
interweave in statecraft. The notions of cascades and leaks are offered as comple-
ments to other prominent metaphors today that likewise speak to the link between 
data and accountability; such as the notions of ‘data dumps’ and ‘data avalanches’.
As will be further contended, the metaphors of leaks and cascades are not only 
helpful in characterising state actions and inactions, they signal the demands faced 
by scholars and others in conducting second-order analyses of data practices.
1.1  Structure of argument
As a response to potential concerns about the how comparative cases are likened and 
differentiated, this article moves between drawing out similarities and differences. 
The next section begins by attending to similarities between responses to Covid-19 
and the Iraq war. In particular, it identifies how officials argued for the inability to 
establish definitive death counts in response to calls to answer for what had taken 
place. Through their appeals to what is unknown, not-yet-known, not-possible-to-
know, not-possible-to-know-with-certainty and not-possible-to-assess and so on, in 
both cases officials crafted what McGoey (2012) termed ‘strategic unknowns’. Sec-
tion Three then investigates the differences in skills, institutions and infrastructures 
marshalled to count deaths across the cases. Section Four advances the aforemen-
tioned metaphors of cascades and leaks to characterise the conditions of possibility 
for how data is made to matter (or not).
In mapping out possibilities for accountability, a principal purpose of this argu-
ment is to support thinking anew. This will take place in two directions: the exten-
sive counting efforts in the case of Covid-19 are used to suggest the highly delimited 
bounds of political accountability in relation to the past actions taken in relation 
to the Iraq war. Furthermore, the official discounting of counts in the Iraq war is 
used to forewarn how the British state could respond to accountability demands for 
deaths associated with Covid-19. Along these lines, at the time of the drafting of 
this article, there is much anticipation of a future public inquiry into the govern-
ment’s handling of the pandemic. The final section proposes some likely fault lines 
for this kind of truth-seeking and ignorance-producing endeavour.
2  Making the dead count
Accountable
1. Required or expected to justify actions or decisions; responsible.
‘ministers are accountable to Parliament’
 B. Rappert 
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2.  Able to be explained or understood.3
2.1  Pandemic deaths in the UK
During the spring of 2020, British ministers and advisors repeatedly offered justifi-
cations for imposing and lifting Covid-19 lockdown restrictions. Traditional politi-
cal forums to hold government to account for its decisions, such as Parliamentary 
debate and media interviews, were complemented with novel ones such as the daily 
press briefings at Number Ten Downing Street.4 In these settings, ‘questions and 
answers’ served as a key interactional mode for displaying relations of accountabil-
ity. Not only were officials interrogated on government policies and practices; they 
were also able to message to the public its responsibilities during the pandemic (to 
stay at home, to stay alert, and so on).
Within these interactions, data—on confirmed cases, hospital admissions, crit-
ical care bed patients, and on deaths—functioned as one of the central bases for 
constituting mutual relations of accountability. Along these lines, counting the 
dead with a view to assessing government performance was an explicit ongoing 
topic from the start of the pandemic. For instance, when the Number 10 press 
briefings began in March 2020, one of the forms of data presented included a 
slide scaling deaths totals in different countries (see Fig. 1). Excel sheets with the 
underlying data were posted on the Number 10 website. Accompanying visual 
depictions of the data provided not only retrospective representations of what had 
Fig. 1  Global Comparison of Deaths on 30 March 2020 Prime Minister’s Office (2020) (Reproduced 
under Open Government Licence.)
3 https:// www. lexico. com/ defin ition/ accou ntable.
4 Records of these briefings are provided at: https:// www. gov. uk/ gover nment/ colle ctions/ slides- and- 
datas ets- to- accom pany- coron avirus- press- confe rences.
1 3
Counting the dead and making the dead count Page 5 of 24    62 
taken place, but the basis for prospective estimates of what might come. Initially 
such information was interpreted by government officials as pointing to how the 
spread of the virus in the UK was tracking alongside other countries in Europe 
(Vallance, 2020).
And yet, more than one connotation of “accountable” is relevant for charac-
terising how data figured into such proceedings. As in the definition at the start 
of this section, besides referring to the expectation to justify actions, the term 
also refers to the underlying ability to explain. By the late spring of 2020, this 
second connotation was repeatedly made relevant. For instance, on 6 May during 
Prime Minister’s (PM) Question Time in Parliament, the leader of the opposition 
Labour Party, Keith Starmer, began by asking:
When the Prime Minister returned to work a week ago Monday, he said that 
many people were looking at the “apparent success” of the Government’s 
approach, but yesterday we learned that, tragically, at least 29,427 people 
in the UK have now lost their lives to this dreadful virus. That is now the 
highest number in Europe and the second highest in the world. That is not 
success, or apparent success, so can the Prime Minister tell us: how on earth 
did it come to this? (Hansard, 2020a: Column 548)
In doing so, Starmer evoked the number of direct deaths officially attributed to 
the virus to rank the performance of the UK and thereby evaluate the British gov-
ernment. This was done as part of calling into doubt the PM’s previously aired 
assessment. Prime Minister Johnson replied to Starmer’s call for an explanation 
by contending that: 
First, of course every death is a tragedy and the right hon. and learned Gen-
tleman is right to draw attention to the appalling statistics, not just in this 
country but around the world. In answer to his question, I would echo what 
we have heard from Professor David Spiegelhalter and others: at this stage I 
do not think that the international comparisons and the data are yet there to 
draw the conclusions that we want […]
Here, rather than offering a justification for his previous assessment of success 
or explaining what caused the 29,427 deaths, Johnson referred to named and 
unnamed others to support the contention that conclusions could not yet be drawn 
based on then present data. As such, no justifications would be given in relation 
to the ‘appalling statistics’ cited by Starmer because comparisons could not yet 
be made.
Starmer responded to Johnson’s suggestion by stating:
The argument that international comparisons cannot be made, when the 
Government have for weeks been using slides such as the one I am holding 
to make international comparisons, really does not hold water. I am afraid 
that many people are concluding that the answer to my question is that the 
UK was slow into lockdown, slow on testing, slow on tracing and slow on 
the supply of protective equipment. (Hansard, 2020a: Column 548)
 B. Rappert 
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Here, the prior availability of information on deaths served as a situational resource 
for contesting Boris Johnson’s suggestion that the ‘international comparisons and 
the data are yet there to draw the conclusions that we want’.
This exchange in Parliament was just one of a series of situations in the first 
half of 2020 (and then well beyond into 2021) in which the government was asked 
to account for the rising and comparatively high number of deaths in the UK, in 
which officials responded through what could be characterised as a tactic of delay 
(e.g., Hansard, 2020b: columns 311–312). For instance, take the 30 April Number 
Ten Downing Street (2020) daily press briefing. Under questioning on comparative 
deaths from a journalist, the Prime Minister cautioned that it was necessary to ‘wait 
and see until the end of the epidemic’ on how countries fared. Citing the article 
by Professor David Spiegelhalter (mentioned by Johnson above), England’s Chief 
Medical Officer, Professor Chris Whitty, echoed the importance to ‘not go charg-
ing into who has won and who has lost’. Caution was warranted since the variations 
in place for how nations were calculating deaths in and outside of hospitals meant 
that comparing their performance was ‘largely a fruitless exercise’. Instead, as Boris 
Johnson contended at the same press briefing, ‘The only real comparison is going to 
be possible at the end of the epidemic, when you look at total excess deaths.’
The category of ‘excess deaths’ gained popular salience in the UK during the pan-
demic. Long familiar to public health specialists, establishing the extent of excess 
deaths involves comparing the total number of deaths over a given time period to 
what would be expected in the absence of a major stress, such as an infectious dis-
ease. The promises of this measure are that it avoids the vagaries of how deaths are 
attributed to diseases and it captures indirect deaths (e.g., those stemming from the 
lack of access to health care).
2.2  Armed conflict in Iraq
The import placed on Covid-19 excess deaths will serve as the entry topic for com-
paring the pandemic to armed conflict. Years previously, the advisability of meas-
uring excess deaths as a gauge of harm figured prominently in British politics in 
relation to another major national undertaking: the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
post-invasion conflict that followed.
As background, in March 2003 a coalition of military forces from the United 
States, the UK, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq. In the UK, the invasion was 
largely justified in terms of the (falsely) alleged Iraqi possession of so-called weap-
ons of mass destruction. The initial decision by British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
to support the US-led war effort generated significant domestic political opposition 
prior to the invasion. While the Iraqi military forces were overrun within a matters 
of weeks and a Coalition Provisional Authority initially put in place to govern, con-
flict persisted. The military occupation of the country would become opposed by an 
armed insurgency. In the years after 2003, the ensuing guerrilla war resulted in con-
siderable deaths to both Iraqis as well as the occupying military forces. The mount-
ing deaths generated further opposition to the original invasion in the US, UK and 
elsewhere. The analysis of the British government response to attempt to establish 
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Iraqi deaths presented in this article is largely drawn from previous research of the 
author based on documents obtained under the UK Freedom of Information (FoI) 
Act (Rappert, 2012a, 2012b) as well as the findings of the official public inquiry into 
the invasion (Iraq Inquiry, 2016).5
As part of the overall contests associated with the invasion, attention to civil-
ian death counts in Iraq underwent a series of shifts within the British government. 
Between 2003 and 2004, internal government deliberations about the possibility of 
deriving figures on the number of civilians directly killed in the initial combat phase 
were initiated in response to growing Parliamentary and public concern post inva-
sion (Iraq Inquiry, 2016: 179–194). Such attention, though, did not lead to meaning-
ful government action to determine the number of civilians killed by UK forces, let 
alone by the conflict as a whole. For instance, while British forces had kept records 
of Iraqis that had died during its significant military operations, this information 
was not collated. Instead, governmental officials repeatedly stated in 2003 and early 
2004 that there was no reliable way to determine the number of civilians killed (Iraq 
Inquiry, 2016: 186).
Attention to deaths in Iraq, and in particular to the category of excess deaths, was 
brought to the fore of political debate in the UK in response to a 2004 excess deaths 
study by a group at Johns Hopkins University published in The Lancet. Using cluster 
statistical sampling, the authors estimated that 98,000 more Iraqis died than would 
have died in the absence of the war. Within this figure, ‘Violence accounted for most 
of the excess deaths and air strikes from coalition forces accounted for most violent 
deaths’ (Roberts et al., 2004).
Following extensive national media attention to this excess deaths study, on 17 
November 2004, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2004) made a statement to Parlia-
ment. As part of it he said: ‘In many cases it would be impossible to make a reli-
ably accurate assessment either of the civilian casualties resulting from any particu-
lar attacks or of the overall civilian casualties of a conflict. This is particularly true 
in the conditions that exist in Iraq.’ Thus not only did he contend that reliable fig-
ures did not exist; he also refuted the possibility of deriving them. Specific critiques 
made of the Lancet study related to the deficiencies of its data: their ‘limited preci-
sion’, the small sample size, the difficulties of accurately attributing responsibility 
for deaths and the problem of inferring civilian status.6
In choosing to question The Lancet study at the level of data in November 2004, 
it was possible for government ministers to discount its findings without questioning 
the statistical clustering method employed to calculate excess deaths—something 
technical advisors warned against in internal cross-departmental communications. 
Working at the level of data, however, at least opened up the prospect of reliable 
figures in the future—if the data could be improved. And yet, this also sat uneas-
ily against the aforementioned contention also offered at the time that establishing 
5 The 48 emails, letters, and other documents obtained as part of three FoI requests are available at: 
https:// brian rappe rt. net/ publi catio ns.
6 Limitations identified by the Ministry of Defence’s Chief Scientific Adviser as part of inter-ministry 
consultations in response to publication of the report.
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reliable figures was ‘impossible’. Further complicating the sense of what was pos-
sible, in his Parliamentary statement, Foreign Secretary Straw (2004) also charac-
terised deaths from hospital admissions as the most reliable information available.
Two years after the 2004 Lancet study came another prominent occasion for 
assessing the data on deaths. In 2006, The Lancet published a second survey by 
Johns Hopkins University. This one estimated that some 655,000 more Iraqis died 
than would have in the absence of the invasion up till 2006 (Burnham et al. 2006). 
In response, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Common-
wealth Office, Lord Triesman, said in the House of Lords:
My Lords, every civilian death is a tragedy and must be of concern in Iraq, as 
elsewhere. However, we continue to believe that there are no comprehensive or 
reliable figures for deaths since 2003. Estimates vary according to the method 
of collection. The figure of 655,000 given in the recent Lancet survey is sig-
nificantly higher than other estimates, including those provided by the Iraqi 
Government. We believe that the Iraqi Government are best placed to monitor 
deaths among their own civilians (Triesman, 2006—see also Ingram, 2006).
This parliamentary statement drew attention to how it carried on with the official 
claims in 2004 that no reliable figures could be available. Yet, it differed in two 
respects. First, no reference was made to the underlying quality of the data of the 
2006 survey (and, thereby, how the 2006 ‘survey’ redressed the central deficien-
cies previously pointed out by Foreign Secretary Straw in 2004). The reason for 
this disregarding was likely concerns raised in inter-ministry consultations. Doc-
uments obtained under the FoI Act indicated that those within the civil service 
repeatedly cited the improvements made to the quality of the underlying data in 
the 2006 study (Rappert, 2012b).
A second difference in the government response to the 2004 and 2006 studies 
related to the shift to what might be deemed as ‘methodological pluralism’ in the 
contention that ‘Estimates vary according to the method of collection’. This mat-
ter was later further spoken to in the House of Lords:
Lord Marsh: My Lords, does the Minister agree that the methodology of 
this study was unique in the way in which it was pursued? It is difficult to 
see how the Government can take the line, “The study was done in a way 
which is well known, and it was done very well, but we don’t think that it is 
worth very much”.
Lord Triesman: My Lords, that is not the view that I have put at all. I said 
that there are different methods which have arrived at very different fig-
ures and that those methods also are legitimate. The way in which data are 
extrapolated from samples to a general outcome is a matter of deep concern 
and merits considerable study rather than the denunciation of one method 
compared with another.
As articulated in Triesman’s statements, the British government position was one 
of both deferring to the Iraqi government and doubting the possibility of sorting 
between what, in more recent parlance, might be called ‘alternative facts’.
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The differences between figures on Iraqi dead derived from different meth-
ods would become a common topic of political and media commentary. The most 
prominent alternative attempt to derive figures was the “Iraq Body Count”. It relied 
on English language news stories as well as other substantiated reports to derive 
tallies through tabulating each confirmed reported civilian death. Over roughly the 
same time period as the 2004 Lancet study—the study that estimated 98,000 excess 
deaths—the Iraq Body Count tallied between 14,284 and 16,419 non-combatants 
deaths from military and paramilitary violence.
3  Counting the dead
The previous section indicated some initial points of similarity and difference in the 
orientation to death counts associated with Covid-19 and the 2003 Iraq invasion. 
For both, excess deaths emerged within high level political debates as a prominent 
metric for gauging harm. For both, however, accountability in the here-and-now was 
side-stepped by British officials through their citing the lack of appropriate data to 
make assessments (and, subsequently in the case of Iraq, by also citing methodologi-
cal variations). Promise was held out by state officials that something like a reliable 
understanding of deaths was at least potentially attainable at some future date that 
might allow for evaluating state action. In the case of Iraq, though, this potential was 
ambiguously situated against the stated impossibility of collecting ‘reliable’ data.
In this section, I want to unpack these headline similarities with regard to the 
status of counts by contrasting how the counting of deaths varied between the two 
cases. The possibilities for accountability through counting will be examined by 
considering the assumptions and choices associated with the inter-related matters of 
(1) the attention to what was being counted; (2) the resources mobilised in counting; 
and (3) the identified purposes of counting.
3.1  What counting counts
While the aforementioned disparity between alternative Iraqi death counts was a 
frequent topic of note by British officials, much less commonplace was attention 
to differences in what was being counted. For instance, Lord Triesman’s October 
2006 statement noted the contrast between the 2006 Lancet figure of 655,000 deaths 
and other tallies, yet without clarifying what those other tallies (such as Iraq Body 
Count) measured. What they measured was only a sub-set of what was captured by 
the Lancet’s all-encompassing excess death figure.7
7 This lack of qualification was not just a feature of government statements. News reports and analysis 
in 2004–2006 and afterwards would highlight disparities between overall deaths counts to contend that 
establishing the number of dead was nearly impossible (e.g., Ellis, 2009; Steele & Goldenberg, 2008). 
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The contrasts to the case of Covid-19 in relation to counting are stark. For 
instance, the circulation of multiple death counts pertaining to potentially overlap-
ping categories was taken as a problem by state agencies from the start of the pan-
demic—one that needed to be remediated least public trust and the ability to track 
the pandemic suffer (see PHE, 2020c; ONS, 2020f). The result of this recognition 
was the progressive differentiation of categories of deaths, and modifications to the 
type of data analysis given in public reports.
Central categories of deaths were also revised in response to identified statistical 
limitations. Notably, for example, in the UK the primary sources for death counts 
were (1) the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) daily figures pertain-
ing to those who tested positive for Covid-19, and (2) the Office of National Statis-
tics (ONS) weekly figures derived from death certificates in which Covid-19 was 
mentioned. In weekly bulletins and one-off reports, the ONS broke down registered 
deaths by age, sex, region and place of death (e.g., ONS, 2020a, d) in order to assess 
the differential burden of the virus. What was covered by these sources changed 
in the spring of 2020 in response to publicly identified deficiencies. A high profile 
instance of this was the inclusion from April 29 of deaths outside of hospitals within 
the DHSC daily figures. For the ONS, revisions included efforts to measure deaths 
in care homes in England (ONS, 2020b), and to break down the causes of excess 
deaths beyond those formally linked to Covid-19 in death certificates in England 
and Wales, even as it was recognised this would be difficult to accomplish (ONS, 
2020c).
In relation to Covid-19, then, regard for what totals included and excluded led 
to reforms and refinements in what information was collected, what categories of 
Fig. 2  Office of National Statistics Breakdown of Types of Covid-19 Deaths (ONS, 2020f) (Reproduced 
under Open Government Licence.)
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deaths were relevant, and what information was made public. The combined result 
was a complex tapestry of sources offering varied perspectives in which unknowns 
about deaths were identified and redressed through reforms in the management and 
analysis of data (see Fig. 2).
By contrast, in the case of Iraqi deaths, the circulation of heterogeneous types 
of data was not taken by the UK as grounds for attempting to clarify, let alone to 
reform, British or Iraqi data management practices. Instead, repeatedly, the var-
ied tallies served as ‘objections of deconstruction, figures impossible to verify and 
locate and therefore incapable of serving any intellectual operation other than that 
of the impossibility of determining their reality’ (Norris, 1994: 290). While officials 
cited an individual tally at certain times, this was done with hedging its ‘reliability’ 
(as in Straw, 2004). As such, data on deaths did not achieve the status of immu-
table mobiles (facts that could circulate while maintaining their integrity, Latour, 
1987). More though, the lack of any internal or external efforts by the UK to engage 
with attempts to assess deaths meant that, for the British state at least, individual 
data sources did not take on the status of being mutable mobiles either.  Unlike for 
Covid-19 deaths to British citizens, Iraqis could not benefit from statistical modi-
fications to the codified traces of their deaths. In the absence of being treated as 
evidence for knowledge claims, it is questionable whether death tallies achieved the 
status of ‘data’ within the dealings of UK officials (Leonelli, 2016). Not being rec-
ognised as data proper meant there was little need to account for their implications.
3.2  Mobilisation
In the case of Covid-19, reforms and refinements were enabled by the large-scale 
mobilisation of government departments and agencies that drew on pre-existing net-
works, resources and lines of authority as well as developed new networks, resources 
and lines of authority. For instance, in England, daily figures on confirmed positive 
tests would come to be derived from multiple sources: (1) hospitals use of a dedi-
cated patient notification system, (2) Health Protections Teams from Public Health 
England through an electronic reporting system, and (3) comparing confirmed posi-
tive Covid-19 case lists held centrally in the pre-existent Second Generation Surveil-
lance System (PHE, 2016) with health service patient records. Through combining 
multiple sources and subjecting them to semi-automatic cross-checks and quality 
assurances, the daily figures sought to provide rigorous information on all Covid-19 
deaths.
In addition, transparency in the procedures for tallying death was sought in order 
to promote public confidence (PHE, 2020c) rather than only to be accurate. While 
geographically dispersed, the combined systems in place sought to function as ‘con-
trol zones’ (Lagoze, 2014) that could ensure the provenance and overall integrity of 
data through drawing on, and thereby reaffirming, established clinical systems.
But if re-enforcing existing ‘control’ mechanisms was a feature of mobilisation 
efforts, so too was the overhaul of previous epistemic conventions. For instance, the 
Office of National Statistics produced weekly figures derived from death certificates. 
Against mounting concerns that care home deaths related to Covid-19 were being 
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missed, in April 2020 the ONS sought to gauge them in England (ONS, 2020b). 
To do so, it collaborated with the Care Quality Commission (CQC), an organisa-
tion that had collected data on deaths of care home residents. Prior to Covid-19, the 
CQC had not previously published data on deaths notified from care homes through 
its on-line reporting systems. One important feature of these notifications is that 
they ‘may or may not correspond to a medical diagnosis or test result, or be reflected 
in the death certification’ (ONS, 2020b). Thus, in making use of the CQC data for 
Covid-19 deaths, the ONS expanded the range of professional and occupational 
expertise as well as documentation that was treated as credible enough to inform its 
figures. Stated differently, through drawing on the notifications, the ONS integrated 
additional uncertainties into how deaths were counted.
In the case of Iraq, Lord Triesman’s call in 2006 for ‘considerable study’ about 
the methods for deriving casualty figures did not lead to the government commis-
sioning such research or adopting externally derived figures (see Iraq Inquiry, 2016: 
208–212). The official inquiry found little indication of efforts by the government 
either to assess direct deaths to civilians during the operations of British forces, 
or (as an occupying power) to improve the Iraqi systems responsible for recording 
deaths and issuing death certificates. A trial that had started in 2004 under the Cabi-
net Office to improve information on civilian deaths from military operations was 
halted before it was completed. Indeed, as it was argued by the Iraq Inquiry (2016: 
218), much ‘more Ministerial and senior official time was devoted to the question of 
which department should have responsibility for the issue of civilian casualties than 
to efforts to determine the actual number’. Concerns about the quality of the data 
on deaths could have served to spur further official collection activities or attempts 
to bring together multiple sources. These concerns did not though. Instead, the por-
trayed difficulties with compiling figures was repeatedly taken as grounds against 
counting deaths at all.
In response to what it identified as limited state efforts, the official independent 
public inquiry into the invasion of Iraq called on the government ‘to make every 
reasonable effort to identify and understand the likely and actual effects of its mili-
tary actions on civilians’ through working with NGOs and academics to establish 
the direct and indirect costs of war (Iraq Inquiry, 2016: 219). However, at the time 
of writing, no such efforts have been undertaken. Instead, echoing statements by 
officials made during the Iraq war against humanitarian concerns, the British state 
has made limited acknowledgement in its more recent military interventions that its 
forces could have caused even direct deaths to civilians (Airwars, 2018; Amnesty 
International, 2018). Efforts by the British government to gauge indirect fatalities 
and excess deaths associated with conflict remain further remote still.
3.3  Purpose
One justification given for the lack of official studies of civilian deaths in the case 
of Iraq was their claimed lack of utility. For instance, the Ministry of Defence’s 
(MoD) Armed Forces Minister at the time of the invasion, Adam Ingram, argued in 
front of the Iraq Inquiry that establishing the number of Iraqi deaths would have not 
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altered the military reality. This was so because the killing ‘was not being carried 
out by us on the civilians’ (Iraq Inquiry, 2016: 213). As Ingram further contended, 
if any deaths figures were to be calculated by the UK, this was not a job for his 
ministry.
If a sense of purpose was lacking in this respect for officials, it was lacking in 
other respects in the wider political and media debate. Just as which deaths were 
included in death counts was rarely specified, so too was the purpose of figures. 
In the case of armed conflict, these purposes can vary from memorialising suffer-
ing of innocents (a key aim of the Iraq Body Count), establishing assistance and 
reconstruction requirements, assessing the effectiveness of policies (a central objec-
tive in The Lancet studies), or revising use of force training and oversight. Yet, such 
purposes were seldom explicitly stated, let alone agreed between stakeholders, and 
certainly rarer still were the comparative merits of specific methodologies related to 
agreed purposes.
In contrast, Covid-19 death figures have not stood apart from the unfolding pan-
demic without any sense of how they might matter. They have served as milestones 
for marking and memorialising deaths, informed determinations of health care 
demands, and provided a means of assessing lockdown restrictions. As well, mor-
tality figures deriving from institutionalised practices for determining the causes of 
death have been used to assess and revise those institutional practices. Such revi-
sions have been intended to feed back into the production of mortality tallies. For 
instance, early on in the spread of the virus, concerns were raised that those in Black, 
Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups might face higher risks than those from 
White ethnic groups. In response to these concerns, and to wider ones about BAME 
health outcome disparities, the British government commissioned Public Health 
England to analyse surveillance data (PHE, 2020a). When this report was released, 
its lack of recommendations about what actions were needed led to widespread criti-
cism (see, for instance, BMA, 2020). Criticism also followed the initial failure of 
the government to publish the findings on a consultation conducted with individu-
als and organisations within BAME communities (e.g., ITV, 2020). This resulted in 
extensive media speculation regarding the possible hidden motivations for the lack 
of publication in which this report’s fate was contextualised within wider ongoing 
national and international attention to the Black Lives Matter movement. When the 
consultation report was published ten days later, it not only called for further data 
collection and research into the biomedical, socio-economic, and structural deter-
minants of health, but also for non-conventional forms of research (PHE, 2020b). 
In particular, the report stressed the need for community participatory research 
projects utilising local knowledge to ensure that research into the effects of Covid-
19 informed concrete actions. Through such calls, the need to challenge existing 
ways of organising research entered into policy discussions in response to acts of 
counting.
It is important as well though to note what purposes counting did not serve. In the 
case of British lockdown policies in the first half of 2020, figures on deaths did not 
inform government formal cost-benefit calculations intended to justify the severity 
and duration of the restrictions placed on free movement. This situation differs from 
many other nation-state activities wherein the need to justify controversial policies 
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has led to new methods to commodify and value bodies (Porter, 1995; Wernimont, 
2018). Indeed, while standard health economic cost-benefit analyses would later 
come to inform British vaccination priorities, the policies for social restrictions have 
not been justified through cost-benefit analyses up until spring 2021.8 This has been 
the case despite some calls for such analysis within the governing political party for 
just such a cost-benefit elaboration (Spinney, 2021). Relatedly, efforts at counting 
deaths have not been marshalled as part of attempts to justify the ‘objectiveness’ of 
lockdown policies (cf. Porter, 1995).
4  Leaks and cascades
Previous sections identified some of the similarities and differences between the 
ways that deaths were counted in relation to Covid-19 and the Iraq war as well as 
how death counts were evaluated. In the case of the Iraq war, British officials both 
refuted specific death counts as well as the ability to count deaths. In contrast, in the 
case of Covid-19, while considerable undertakings were made to count, accountabil-
ity for tallied deaths has been rebuffed to date.
Following on from these sections, this one offers contrasting metaphors for char-
acterising the relation between counts, counting and accountability: cascades and 
leaks. The intended relevances of these metaphors are two-fold. At one level, they 
are offered as conceptual shorthands for characterising data practices vis-à-vis state 
accountability for deaths. At another level, they are offered to set out a sense of the 
demands faced by scholars and others in conducting second-order analyses of state 
practices. In holding together these two levels, I want to advance further sensitivities 
and nuances for understanding the possibilities for accountability.
To begin with the first level, the metaphors of cascades and leaks speak to the 
relative overall differences in the quality of attention given to the dead by the Brit-
ish state. One way of breaking down this attention is through Laney’s (2001) data 
management typology relating to the volume, velocity, and variety of data. The vol-
ume of data produced in relation to the two cases differs dramatically. For Iraq, little 
effort was made by the state to tally data on who died directly or indirectly from the 
armed conflict and the data set produced by others were side-lined. In contrast, the 
management of data abundancy was a recurring demand for Covid-19.
Defining velocity as the speed at which data is accumulated and processed over 
time, in the case of Iraq the velocity of data was low. In the years that followed the 
invasion, the institutional apparatuses of the British state were almost exclusively 
limited to formulating sceptical evaluations of others’ intermittent efforts to gauge 
deaths (Rappert, 2012a; Iraq Inquiry, 2016). In contrast, between spring and sum-
mer of 2020, numerous reports, briefings, and datasets were produced in relation to 
Covid-19. Deficiencies identified in how official data were collected and reported 
brought revisions—such as determining contributory factors to specific categories 
8 Although attempts have been made by economists to conduct cost–benefit analyses, see, for instance, 
Rowthorn and Maciejowski (2020).
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of deaths (ONS, 2020e). The identification of deficiencies also brought the tempo-
rary suspension of the publication of daily DHSC figures between 17 July and 11 
August. This suspension was initiated because of concerns that these tallies for Eng-
land included individuals who tested positive for Covid-19, but subsequently died 
from unrelated causes. As a result of the review undertaken into the methods for 
tallying counts, the DHSC total for the England was reduced by 5337 deaths and 
new criteria were implemented to standardise counting across the nations of the UK. 
In this way, a tally derived at a particular point in time informed (or at least was 
expected to inform) subsequent activities; including what should circulate as data 
in the first place. Through such iterations, the counting of deaths could be charac-
terised as the result of successive stages—stages that unfolded over a time span of 
weeks.
The ability to handle data variety (Laney, 2001), in the sense of mixing and man-
aging heterogeneous types of data, provides another dimension for comparison. How 
to mix and manage data originating from multiple sources was an ongoing topic 
of explicit attention for Covid-19; one that led to various sequential refinements in 
data collection and analysis. In the case of Iraq, by contrast, officials positioned the 
availability of heterogeneous data and associated analyses as an insurmountable 
problem. Instead of serving as bases for the ever-refinement of inquiry, alternative 
data and analysis were orientated to as proof of the impossibility of deriving reliable 
knowledge.
To the volume, velocity, and variety of data management practice, the previ-
ous section suggests another dimension squarely related to political accountability: 
value.9 In particular, as a sub-set of value considerations, different orientations are 
evident across the cases in relation to the urgency. This term refers to the political 
imperative associated with attempts to produce knowledge. In the case of Covid-19, 
establishing the number of dead was treated as a responsibility of the state from the 
outset—a goal that was portrayed as necessary to pursue despite the complexities of 
doing so. Counting served as a basis for accountability in the taken-for-granted way 
the state had a duty to strive to protect its citizens. In addition, significant efforts 
were undertaken to ensure all deaths that could be counted were counted—be they 
deaths associated with Covid-19 directly or its secondary effects.
For those lives affected by the invasion of Iraq (an invasion partly justified as a 
means of liberating ordinary Iraqis), the contrast could hardly be starker. Counting 
was not treated as a duty of the British state from the start (or thereafter).10 Unsur-
prisingly then, little by way of resources were mobilised toward doing so.11 Moreo-
ver, the complications of deriving figures were regularly positioned as undercutting 
9 For a discussion of value and knowledge, see Farquhar and Sunder Rajan (2014).
10 In large part because of the perceived absence of a legal requirement on the UK, see Iraq Inquiry 
(2016: 200).
11 This contrasts somewhat with the extent of attention to Iraqi casualties in the US, see Fischer (2010).
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specific counts. The decidedly limited efforts made to compile information only per-
tained to deaths directly associated with British operations.12 As noted in the previ-
ous section, as seen by the state at least, the complied traces of deaths were arguably 
not even regarded as ‘data’ that needed to be accounted for.
Building on the identification of these highly contrasting configurations of the 
volume, velocity, variety, and value of data, I now want to sum up the differences 
between the cases by elaborating the notions of cascades and leaks.
The metaphor of cascades signals a situation wherein deriving and analysing data 
is regarded as crucial. More than just this though, cascade also signals the sequential 
modification of data and its analysis. In the case of Covid-19, a significant chal-
lenge faced by state agencies was how to manage the profusion of data and data 
types emerging over a relatively short period of time in order to present the most 
accurate and useful tallies possible. Counts of deaths at any one time could thereby 
inform subsequent actions. Overall, the identification of unknowns and uncertain-
ties associated with how to count spurred further data generation efforts. However, 
the case of Covid-19 illustrates that establishing a dynamic pattern of counting need 
not led enable accountability. Indeed, at least to date, the very fluidity of counting 
efforts has been positioned by officials so as to undercut the need to account for 
death counts. As noted in Section Two, against the unfolding pandemic, claims were 
made that it was too early to evaluate deaths. As an inter-linked sequence of ongo-
ing activities, the cascading together of data in relation to Covid-19 deaths served as 
grounds for forestalling calls to account for what had taken place.
In contrast, the metaphor of leaks signals an alternative set of practices and orien-
tations. In the case of the invasion of Iraq, amassing data on deaths was not treated 
to as vital by officials; it was even regarded as a distraction. As such, no pattern of 
successive, iterative stages of data gathering and analysing was generated. As noted 
in Section Two, against emerging excess death counts, refutations were made against 
the possibility of counting deaths and the unreliability of any death counts. Instead 
of the identification of unknowns and uncertainties leading to the mobilisation of 
further resources and innovations as they had done in the case of Covid-19, for Iraq 
unknowns and uncertainties were treated by the British state over many years as 
standing against the possibility of establishing how many Iraqis died. In short, data 
on deaths led nowhere. The challenge of securing accountability from officials in 
these conditions stemmed from the limited amount of data available and the manner 
it was called into doubt—again and again.
12 In the absence of significant involvement by major belligerent states, humanitarian NGOs have taken 
it upon themselves to develop internationally recognised standards for casualty recording. These efforts 
relate not only to the quality of data, transparency of how data is collected and analysed, but also call on 
groups to anticipate how their recording efforts might cause harm (Every Casualty, 2016).
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4.1  The conditions for second‑order analysis
More than just speaking to the manner officials operated vis-à-vis accountability for 
deaths, I want to use the metaphors of cascades and leaks to speak to the varied con-
ditions faced by analysts—scholars, journalists and others—seeking to offer second-
order analyses of statecraft.
‘Leak’ provides an apt metaphor in the case of Iraq since, at least for many years 
following 2003, what was understood about internal government deliberations 
derived from small openings in access that were not planned. These included the 
unsanctioned release of documents to the media or official papers obtained through 
the FoI Act that come into force in 2005. Interpreting FoI documents brings a host 
of complications—a prominent one being partiality. While studies by the author 
prior to the Iraq Inquiry were able to draw on three sets of overlapping FoI requests 
during 2008–2010, in the end only some 48 emails, letters, and other documents 
(often moderately redacted) were obtained. Later, when the official Iraq Inquiry was 
given widespread access to official documentation and was able to call witnesses to 
testify, the limitations of the history that could be constructed previously became 
evident (cf. Iraq Inquiry, 2016; Rappert, 2012a).
The extent of the availability of information matters in the case of Iraq because 
of the way in which ministers and others forwarded refutations of derived tallies 
generated within a sequestered coterie. As a result, understanding the deliberative 
bases for these refutations was a central requirement in trying to establish how the 
UK acted in relation to concerns over Iraqi deaths. In this respect, whatever could be 
made visible about the internal deliberations—who knew what when and on what 
basis—added greatly to what was appreciated publicly.
Identifying disparities between what officials stated publicly on different occa-
sions, and what was said in public statements and leaked deliberations, provided one 
means for analysts to try to surmise the inner workings of the state.13 With such dis-
parities identified, at times explanations were forwarded by appealing to the kinds of 
‘transparent political aims’ (Nettelfield, 2010: 167) often attributed to governments 
in armed conflict. For instance, the personal and political motivations of officials 
were marshalled to explain disparities between what was said in sequestered docu-
ments and in public forums (e.g., Horton, 2007).14 With so little ability to scrutinise 
the deliberations of British statecraft, the resort to motive- or interest-based explana-
tions to bridge over gaps in what could be reconstructed was predictable.
Yet, the ability to discern the personal or shared group motives rests on the pros-
pect of analysts being able to settle a variety of questions relating to how official 
documents should be interpreted. For instance, seeking to establish the real meaning 
the leaked or FoI documents implicated questions such as: How literal or readily 
decipherable are internal in-group communications? To what extent were officials 
13 As an instance of how government portrayals varied over time, contrast Symons (2004a, 2004b) 
regarding the reliability of hospital figures.
14 Such efforts were aligned with a “methodological individualism” that takes individuals to be inten-
tional, rational, and calculating (as in Thomas, 2017).
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deliberately crafting records with an eye to how they would later be made account-
able for their (in)actions (Rappert, 2012a)?
In the case of Covid-19, with the emerging cascading of information, it is still 
possible to attribute underlying motives or interests to ministers and advisors (as 
well as the more general appeal to frontstage/backstage, inner/outer, public/private 
spheres). However, the extent of activity taking place across varied organisations 
within and outside of the state makes appeals to the motivations and wilful acts of 
individuals less salient, because the ability of officials to delimit or steer what is 
taking place is comparatively conditioned by others. Indeed, an important feature 
of the discussion of Covid-19 has been the manner it has involved public contests 
of a panoply of expertise that extends far beyond the central machinery of the state 
(Grundmann, 2020). In turn, that overt contest itself calls into question conceiving 
of a central task of secondary research as making visible the inner workings of the 
state. Instead, discernment is needed by analysts in determining what to examine 
and how to interpret it.
5  Counts and accountability
The two previous sections highlighted points of dissimilarities between British 
responses to the Covid-19 pandemic and the invasion of Iraq in relation to practices 
of counting. In this final section, I want to return to similarities between the cases; 
both existent and possible.
Specifically, this will be done in relation to the widely anticipated (but as yet ill-
defined) public inquiry into the handling of Covid-19 in the UK. As in the case of 
the Iraq war, public inquiries have long figured as prominent occasions for inves-
tigating the rights and wrongs of British statecraft. They have also been topics of 
contest regarding whether their scope, terms and powers have held governments to 
scrutiny (Public Administration Select Committee, 2005; Rolston & Scraton, 2005). 
In short, public inquiries are both truth telling and ignorance generating enterprises. 
As suggested previously regarding the Iraq Inquiry’s call for the UK to understand 
direct and indirect deaths, the likelihood that public inquiries result in meaningful 
reforms is a further matter for doubt.
By situating deaths with Covid-19 against the aforementioned dynamics asso-
ciated with deaths in Iraq, I want to propose matters for attention regarding how 
accountability might figure in any such inquiry. An opening point for doing so is to 
underscore a contention underpinning the previous analysis: accountability is a situ-
ational and unfolding accomplishment, rather than a locked-in achievement. What 
kinds of justifications for actions are given, and whether justifications are treated 
as able to be given or necessary at all, emerge from the particulars of interactions. 
For instance, at the end of July 2020, the ONS (2020f) published a study comparing 
excess deaths across twenty-nine European countries between 3 January to 12 June. 
Within this report, England was identified as having the highest levels of excess 
mortality. Its publication, however, was not treated that day by the British Prime 
Minister in a news interview (Neilan, 2020) or Secretary of State for Health and 
Social Care in a speech (Hancock, 2020) as an occasion to draw (even provisional) 
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international comparisons or evaluations of any kind related to death rates. Instead, 
both politicians spoke to fears prevalent during the end of July of a resurgence of 
Covid-19 elsewhere in Europe. Thus, while Covid-19 is a topic onto which substan-
tial resources have been devoted, the quality and nature of the accountability real-
ised depends on how evidence and argument are mobilised.
The previous analysis of the twists and turns with the dead of Iraq suggested how 
considerable state effort can be made to evade accounting for harms. The relevance 
of such experience for Covid-19 is a matter worthy of consideration. If it is taken to 
be the case that ‘in terms of mobilising the resources of the state, the pandemic has 
been as close as you can get to fighting a war without actually fighting a war’ (Han-
cock, 2020), then it is also conceivable that mobilisation of the state could extend to 
contesting its accountability for lives lost. This, too, is a common aspect of what it 
means to mobilise for war.15 In the previous sections, disregarding, doubting, defer-
ring, deconstructing, delaying and displacing were some of the characterisations 
offered for how the possibility for accountability was foreclosed, diminished or side-
stepped in relation to Iraqi deaths.
The imperative associated with counting in the case of the pandemic would sug-
gest that many of the kinds of evasions prevalent in the case of Iraq could not apply 
to Covid-19. For the latter, the need for official agencies to count deaths has been 
a taken for granted duty. The situation might well prove more complicated, how-
ever, with regard to the standings of counts. This is so because, as illustrated through 
the cases examined here as elsewhere (Deringer, 2018), the imperative to engage in 
counting does not determine the import of counts.16
In closing, I want to forward future orientated concerns with accountability for 
Covid-19 deaths in a public inquiry—concerns that are sensitive to the scope for 
contrasting relations between data, knowledge and ignorance. I do so by proposing 
some of the ways in which accountability for deaths might be repulsed despite the 
considerable counting of deaths in the case of Covid-19:
Ever-delay As previous sections indicated, delay figured as a response to initial 
calls account for the number of Covid-19 deaths in the UK. The case of Iraq illus-
trates how attempts to hold the state responsible were rebuffed for years through 
arguing death counts were unreliable or otherwise in doubt. In the case of Covid-19, 
the wide-ranging nature of efforts to count could itself be marshalled to support a 
similar outcome. For instance, the imperative to definitively unpack the complexities 
of the biomedical, socio-economic, and structural determinants of death could be 
cited to forestall the possibility of political accountability till far beyond the time of 
any public inquiry.
15 For one case of how counts of deaths were mobilised, see Dyson and Cetorelli (2017).
16 Likewise, the relationship between data on deaths and accountability for actions is indeterminate. For 
instance, Western governments have taken it as a core obligation of the state to determine the number of 
their own fallen military personnel in war. Rather than mounting deaths being a reason for re-assessing 
state action, though, the reporting of deaths has been marshalled by officials in an operative manner to 
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Prevalence Previous sections outlined the significant differences in the amount 
and variety of data pertaining to deaths across the two cases. I suggested that these 
differences stemmed from starkly contrasting premises regarding the expected duties 
of the state. The prevalence of data and associated analyses in the case of Covid-19 
might be taken as standing against the potential to contend that Covid-19 deaths 
cannot be derived. However, the case of Iraq illustrates how the availability of mul-
tiple and varied counts overtime were positioned by ministers to support the notion 
that it was not possible to derive reliable tallies. In the case of Covid-19, in the 
future, the ability to point to varied counts could function as situational stratagem 
for responding to criticisms or rebuffing calls for explanations.17 More subtly, such 
varied efforts could also be cited by officials to create a narrative that deaths can-
not be established definitively. Thus, while every death would be acknowledged as 
a tragedy, the overall conclusion would be that comparative evaluations of the han-
dling of the pandemic cannot be made with any real certainty.18
Metrics As expressed in the early stages of the epidemic, excess deaths were 
identified by officials as the metric for comparison across countries. However, the 
invasion of Iraq illustrates the ability of governments to radically shift metrics (for 
instance, recorded hospital deaths) in the face of inconvenient developments (Rap-
pert, 2012b).
Standards and Expertise For deaths in Iraq, central characterisations of the data 
available—most notably its ‘reliability’—were marshalled in a manner that fostered 
ambiguity about what claims were being made and what evaluative standards were 
in operation. While considerable efforts have been undertaken to establish shared 
meaning of technical terms and categories related to the methods of determining 
Covid-19-related deaths, the standard for judging the validity of data remains open 
to contest. At the time of writing, for instance, the inability to establish the ‘true’, 
‘exact’ or ‘absolutely firm’ death toll has served as a basis for some commentators 
to posit an irreducible ignorance regarding deaths (e.g., Lyons, 2020). Such a belief 
could be marshalled in any number of ways; for instance, to claim some without spe-
cialised knowledge (e.g., ‘the public’, journalists, and so on) cannot understand what 
statistics really mean (ibid.).
Purpose An appeal to true deaths tolls suggests an all-purpose number is pos-
sible in the first place. Against the multiple totals forwarded for Iraq, the inability to 
establish one definitive measure was positioned as scuppering the wisdom of trying 
to derive tallies at all. The suggestion that counts could vary depending on the pur-
poses for which they served was rarely voiced. In the case of Covid-19, figures on 
deaths have had a complex relation to purpose. Numbers have been used to inform 
public health responses, but also to memorialise victims. To instil public trust, 
repeated efforts have been made to standardise what deaths within public reporting 
figures. Despite such efforts, uncertainty about the possibility of causally attributing 
deaths to Covid-19 has also been acknowledged. Such complexity provides ample 
ground for multiple and conflicting claims about what data matter, and the ultimate 
17 Arguably it has done so already, see Hansard (2020a: Column 548).
18 See Proctor (2011) for a historical examination of utility of these kinds of arguments.
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possibility for ‘adequately’ understanding deaths. Thus, a matter for the future is 
how to ensure the scope for plurality in purposes does not become a basis for sub-
stantially undermining the possibility for justifying actions.
6  Conclusion
Efforts to determine the number of deaths associated with Covid-19 have been cen-
tral to the response measures of many governments, NGOs and inter-governmental 
agencies. In part, assembling such data has been regarded as vital in holding gov-
ernments to account for their actions and inactions. And yet, promoting political 
accountability through data is not at all straightforward.
By comparing two major cases of statecraft in which methodological concerns 
associated with deriving death tallies have featured prominently in public debates, 
this article has considered the fraught relation between data and accountability. It 
has done so through distinguishing the varied commitments and investments associ-
ated with counts and counting. What has been sought is a two way reflection. By 
contrasting the extensive efforts to count Covid-19 deaths against the scant efforts 
taken in the case of Iraqi dead, I have illustrated how efforts can be made to delimit 
democratic accountability. In addition, the strategies of officials to discount death 
counts in the Iraq war have served to warn how the British state might contest 
demands for accountability for Covid-19 related deaths. How such possibilities 
unfold in the years to come will be a measure of both democracy and data.
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